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Abstract: 
Research on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity has illuminated distinct 
patterns of cognition, motivation, and behavior in interindividual versus 
intergroup contexts. However, it has examined these processes in 
laboratory environments with perfect transparency, whereas real-life 
interactions are often characterized by noise (i.e., misperceptions and 
unintended errors). This research compared interindividual and intergroup 
interactions in the presence or absence of noise. In a laboratory 
experiment, participants played 35 rounds of a dyadic give-some dilemma, 
in which they acted as individuals or group representatives. Noise was 
manipulated, such that players’ intentions either were perfectly translated 
into behavior, or could deviate from their intentions in certain rounds 
(resulting in less cooperative behavior). Noise was more detrimental to 
cooperation in intergroup contexts than in interindividual contexts, because 
(a) participants who formed benign impressions of the other player coped 
better with noise, and (b) participants were less likely to form such benign 
impressions in intergroup than interindividual interactions. 
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Abstract 
Research on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity has illuminated distinct patterns of 
cognition, motivation, and behavior in interindividual versus intergroup contexts. However, it 
has examined these processes in laboratory environments with perfect transparency, whereas 
real-life interactions are often characterized by noise (i.e., misperceptions and unintended 
errors). This research compared interindividual and intergroup interactions in the presence or 
absence of noise. In a laboratory experiment, participants played 35 rounds of a dyadic give-
some dilemma, in which they acted as individuals or group representatives. Noise was 
manipulated, such that players’ intentions either were perfectly translated into behavior, or 
could deviate from their intentions in certain rounds (resulting in less cooperative behavior). 
Noise was more detrimental to cooperation in intergroup contexts than in interindividual 
contexts, because (a) participants who formed benign impressions of the other player coped 
better with noise, and (b) participants were less likely to form such benign impressions in 
intergroup than interindividual interactions. 
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Coping with Noise in Social Dilemmas:  
Group Representatives Fare Worse Than Individuals Because They Lack Trust in Other’s 
Benign Intentions  
 In politics, in collective bargaining, in the international community: interactions 
between groups fundamentally shape our lives. For this reason, it is important to understand 
such interactions, and to determine what benefits and risks they may entail for our collective 
welfare. A considerable body of research has revealed that, relative to interactions between 
isolated individuals, intergroup interactions are more competitive, aggressive, and intractable 
– a phenomenon called interindividual-intergroup discontinuity (Insko & Schopler, 1998; 
Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). An important limitation of this research 
program, however, is that it has studied interindividual and intergroup interactions in 
laboratory contexts with perfect transparency, where decisions match intentions. In real life, 
however, social interactions are often characterized by misperceptions and unintended errors 
or noise, such that one’s actions may produce different outcomes, or may be perceived 
differently, than intended (Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Bendor, Kramer, & Stout, 1991; Kollock, 
1993; Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002). Indeed, such noise may be particularly 
prominent in intergroup interactions, which are often characterized by differences in norms, 
customs, and language that are conductive to misunderstanding. It is therefore important to 
gain insight into the difference between interindividual and intergroup interactions in noisy 
environments. 
Our key objective was to examine the impact of noise in interindividual and 
intergroup settings. We did so by comparing interactions between individuals and between 
group representatives: individuals who have been appointed to make decisions on behalf of 
their group (Reinders Folmer, Klapwijk, De Cremer, & Van Lange, 2012; also see Aaldering, 
Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013; Milinski, Hilbe, Semmann, Sommerfeld, & Marotzke, 
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2016; Pinter et al., 2007). In everyday life, groups often interact through group 
representatives (i.e., through their leaders, representatives, or delegates; Adams, 1976). 
Hence, by studying interactions between group representatives, we increased mundane 
realism. Furthermore, dyadic interactions between group representatives resemble closely 
dyadic interactions between isolated individuals, thus providing a stringent test of the 
difference between interindividual and intergroup interactions as a function of noise. We 
examine these processes in a social dilemma where noise is either present or absent. 
The Impact of Noise in Interindividual and Intergroup Settings 
How does noise affect interindividual and intergroup interactions? Extant research on 
this question is restricted to interindividual contexts and has distinguished between positive 
(i.e., own decisions affect others more positively than intended) and negative (i.e., own 
decisions affect others more negatively than intended) noise (Axelrod & Dion, 1988; 
Kollock, 1993; Signorino, 1996). Findings indicate that negative noise has a powerful, 
detrimental impact on interpersonal cooperation, which exceeds the beneficial effect of 
positive noise (Signorino, 1996). Furthermore, negative noise may be more prevalent in 
everyday life and has more harmful consequences in social relationships (Van Lange et al., 
2002). Accordingly, we focused on the impact of negative noise in interindividual and 
intergroup interactions (cf. Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009; Tazelaar, van Lange, & 
Ouwerkerk, 2004; Van Lange et al., 2002).  
Negative noise (henceforth: noise) exerts detrimental effects on cooperation through 
two possible mechanisms. First, noise affecting one’s own decisions (own-noise) results in 
unintended harm to others and it is costly to repair such unintended negative effects on 
others’ outcomes (Bendor et al., 1991; Van Lange et al., 2002). Second, noise affecting 
others’ decisions (other-noise) can lead one to underestimate others’ cooperativeness. Noise 
may lead others to appear as less cooperative than they actually are, which may reduce one’s 
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own cooperativeness toward them (Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van Lange et al., 2002). What do 
these processes imply for the impact of noise in intergroup interactions? We hypothesized 
that noise would be more harmful to cooperation in intergroup contexts than in interpersonal 
ones, and hence, would accentuate the discontinuity effect. The rationale for this prediction is 
that the two mechanisms that explain the detrimental impact of noise in interpersonal 
interactions will be amplified in intergroup contexts.  
First, intergroup interactions are characterized by greater greed, such that people 
display more self-regarding preferences and behavior in intergroup contexts than in 
interpersonal ones (Insko & Schopler, 1998; Wildschut et al., 2003). Their tendency to do so 
stems from (1) perceived normative obligations to benefit the ingroup, (2) the cloak of 
anonymity that groups provide, and (3) group members’ mutual support for competitive 
initiatives (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). Crucially, these processes imply that own-noise is 
more detrimental in intergroup contexts: due to their greater greed, groups (relative to 
individuals) will be less inclined to incur the cost of repairing unintended negative effects of 
own-noise on others’ outcomes. 
A second reason why noise should be more detrimental in intergroup contexts is that 
intergroup interactions are characterized by greater fear. According to this explanation, 
intergroup competitiveness is rooted in learned beliefs that outgroup members are more 
aggressive, deceitful, and competitive than individuals (i.e., schema-based distrust, Insko & 
Schopler, 1998; Pemberton, Insko, & Schopler, 1996). This distrust evokes defensive, 
competitive behavior as a means to protect the ingroup against the anticipated 
competitiveness of other groups. The notion that intergroup interactions are characterized by 
greater fear has important implications for the impact of other-noise, because people’s ability 
to cope with such incidents is critically dependent on benign partner impressions (Bendor et 
al., 1991; Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van Lange et al., 2002). To overcome other-noise, it is crucial 
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to give the other player the benefit of the doubt when faced with its negative outcomes 
(Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009; Kollock, 1993). The greater fear in 
intergroup interactions, however, implies that groups will be less likely to respond in this 
cooperative manner. Thus, other-noise may be more detrimental to cooperation in intergroup 
contexts, because groups (compared to individuals) lack the benign partner impressions 
(Hoyle, Pinkley, & Insko, 1989) that are necessary to overcome other-noise. 
The Present Research 
In sum, the present research aimed to examine the differential impact of noise in 
interindividual and intergroup settings, and to understand how the presence of noise affects 
the magnitude of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. To do so, we used a dyadic social 
dilemma task. Social dilemmas present a conflict between protagonists’ immediate self-
interest and longer-term collective interests (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). 
In situations like these, protagonists choose between competitive (or noncooperative) 
decisions (which benefit their immediate self-interest, but are harmful for the collective 
interest) or cooperative decisions (which benefit the collective interest, but are 
disadvantageous for their immediate self-interest). Social dilemmas are suitable for our 
present purposes because they provide an environment in which the discontinuity effect 
emerges (Schopler et al., 2001) and in which the disruptive impact of noise can be studied 
(Van Lange et al., 2002; Tazelaar et al., 2004). Participants played an iterated social dilemma, 
situated in an interaction between either two individual players or two group representatives 
(Pinter et al., 2007; Reinders Folmer et al., 2012). The decisions of the other player (or 
partner) were simulated by a preprogrammed tit-for-tat strategy (consistent with prior noise 
research; Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van Lange et al., 2002). In designated rounds, we 
manipulated the presence (vs. absence) of noise by altering the decisions of either player to 
be less cooperative than they intended. Because the preprogrammed tit-for-tat strategy 
Page 6 of 32
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gpir
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
COPING WITH NOISE 
 
7
exactly reciprocates participants’ own decisions, this paradigm enables us to isolate the 
impact of noise on participants’ decisions independently of their partner’s decisions, and to 
distinguish between participants’ responses to own-noise and other-noise.  
In this setting, we aimed to test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Levels of cooperation will be lower in intergroup interactions between 
group representatives than in interpersonal interactions between individuals. 
Hypothesis 2: Levels of cooperation will be lower in interactions where noise is 
present than in interactions where noise is absent. 
Hypothesis 3: Differences in levels of cooperation between representatives and 
individuals will be greater in interactions where noise is present than in interactions where 
noise is absent. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were 294 students at Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam (103 men, 191 
women; Mage = 20.52, SD = 2.91). They were recruited through flyers at the university dining 
halls, and randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (interaction type: individual vs. 
representative) × 2 (negative noise: present vs. absent) between-participants design.1 In light 
of prior evidence for gender effects in the context of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
(i.e., female groups responding more competitively than male groups when conflict of 
interest is severe; Schopler et al., 2001), we included gender as an additional predictor. Power 
analysis with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated sufficient power 
(power = .95) for Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) to detect a medium effect (f = .25) at p 
< .05. 
Procedure 
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 Up to 15 participants attended each experimental session. They were seated in 
individual cubicles containing a computer, on which the entire experiment was conducted.  
Manipulation of interaction type. In order to examine interactions between group 
representatives, a context was required in which two meaningful groups could be 
distinguished, on whose behalf the participants could interact. To do so, we presented the 
study as a collaborative research project between the VU and the University of Amsterdam 
(cf. Reinders Folmer et al., 2012). In the representative condition, participants were told that 
students were attending the experimental session at either institution, and would be combined 
into a VU-team and a UvA-team. They learned that a single group representative would be 
selected for each team and that these representatives would interact dyadically on their team’s 
behalf. Participants were further informed that the outcomes of the representatives’ 
interaction would determine the rewards of all the members of their team. A rigged lottery 
procedure ensured that participants were always assigned to the role of group representative. 
In the individual condition (where no intergroup context was required), no groups were 
distinguished and participants interacted dyadically with another participant, with the 
outcomes of their interaction determining their rewards. The rewards that could be obtained 
in the task were vouchers for a postexperimental raffle, in which a 15 euro ($17) book 
certificate could be won by the participant (individual condition) or all team members 
(representative condition; see Van Lange et al., 2002).2  
The social dilemma task. The task was a dyadic, iterated, gradual give-some social 
dilemma adopted from previous noise research (Van Lange et al., 2002; Tazelaar et al., 
2004). We selected this paradigm rather than the binary social dilemma task that is typically 
employed in discontinuity research (e.g., Insko et al., 1998; Schopler et al., 2001) because it 
allows gradual increases and decreases in level of cooperation, which makes it suitable for 
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representing the impact of noise, and affords the generous strategies that are necessary to 
overcome it (Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009).  
Participants received an endowment of 10 grey coins at the start of every round. The 
other player received an endowment of 10 blue coins. We explained that the value of these 
coins differed for both players. The participant’s grey coins were worth 50 cent each to 
him/herself, but were worth 100 cents each to the other player. Likewise, the other player’s 
blue coins were worth 50 cent each to him/herself, but 100 cents to the participant. In the 
task, players would be able to donate coins to each other. Although giving away coins is 
detrimental to one’s individual outcome, it is highly beneficial for the recipient, as one’s 
coins are twice as valuable to the other player. As such, players can collectively earn more by 
donating coins to each other (i.e., collective rationality). Individually, however, they can earn 
more by keeping their own coins while receiving coins from the other player (i.e., individual 
rationality). Therefore, this situation is a social dilemma, in which donations represent a 
continuous measure of cooperation (with a contribution of zero coins reflecting minimal 
cooperation, and a contribution of ten coins maximal cooperation; see Van Lange et al., 
2002).
3
  
Participants played 35 rounds of the social dilemma task (the actual number was 
unknown to them). In each round, both players simultaneously decided how many coins to 
give to the other, after which their decisions and outcomes were revealed. Although 
participants believed they were interacting with another person, we simulated the other player 
using a preprogrammed tit-for-tat strategy. Tit-for-tat is often considered a “default” strategy 
in interaction research and players frequently employ reciprocal strategies in social dilemmas 
(e.g., Parks, Sanna, & Posey, 2003; Tazelaar et al., 2004). As such, this strategy is suitable for 
simulating the decisions of another player. Consistent with previous research, the other player 
was programmed to initiate the task with a moderately cooperative contribution of 6 coins 
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(out of 10) and, thereafter, to reciprocate the participant’s contribution in the previous round 
(Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van Lange et al., 2002). 
 Manipulation of noise. Following the instructions to the social dilemma task, we 
introduced the noise manipulation. In the no-noise condition, we did not mention noise and 
participants’ decisions always reflected their intended level of cooperation. In the noise 
condition, participants received additional instructions that explained that players’ decisions 
in the task could be affected by noise. Specifically, participants in the noise condition learned 
that we were interested in how people make decisions in “situations in which the actual 
decision(s) by both persons may now and then have different results than they actually 
intended” (Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van Lange et al., 2002). Accordingly, they learned that the 
computer would change their decisions or those of the other player in some rounds of the 
interaction, so that the player in question would donate more or fewer coins than he/she had 
actually intended (in fact, only negative noise occurred; Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van Lange et 
al., 2002). Such changes potentially could occur in any round of the interaction, and whereas 
the player whose donation was changed would be informed of this, its recipient would not. 
Therefore, during the task, participants in the noise condition could not determine if the 
number of coins they received from the other player reflected an intentional choice or a 
change by the computer, nor would the other player be able to make this distinction in the 
participant’s own donations.4 
 The social dilemma task comprised 35 rounds and we administered noise on every 
fourth round (i.e., a noise frequency of 25%), with instances alternating between the two 
players (i.e., affecting the participant’s decision in round 4, the other player’s decision in 
round 8, etc.). When noise occurred, three coins were subtracted from the number of coins 
that the player had intended to contribute (i.e., negative noise) – an intensity that was unlikely 
to go by unnoticed.5 As noted, a warning was displayed whenever the participant’s decision 
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had been affected by noise, but participants received no warning when the other player’s 
decisions had been affected. Upon completion of the task, we administered a 
postexperimental questionnaire assessing participants’ impressions of the other player. 
 Measuring impressions of benign intent. We assessed participants’ global 
impressions of their partner’s benign intent with ten items (Tazelaar et al., 2004). Participants 
indicated to what extent their partner was “generous,” “nice,” “forgiving,” “kind,” “noble,” 
“selfish,” “greedy,” “competitive,” “stingy,” and “vengeful” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much, 
negative items reverse-coded, α = .78). As a further specification of these impressions, we 
also assessed participants’ perceptions of the specific interaction goals that comprise these 
global impressions (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), namely the tendency to maximize joint 
outcomes (MaxJoint, e.g., “the other person [representative] wanted to get the most outcomes 
for the both of us [both of our teams]”, α = .90); to minimize the difference between each 
party’s outcomes (MinDiff, e.g., “the other person [representative] wanted to minimize the 
differences in outcomes between me and him/her [my team and his/her team]”, α = .78); to 
maximize the participant’s outcomes (MaxOther, e.g., “the other person [representative] 
wanted me [my team] to get the highest outcomes”, α = .68); to maximize the relative 
advantage over the other party’s outcomes (MaxRel, e.g., “the other person [representative] 
wanted to get higher outcomes than me [my team]”, α = .81); and to maximize outcomes for 
oneself (MaxOwn, e.g., “the other person [representative] wanted to get the highest possible 
outcomes for him/herself ”, α = .70). We assessed these five perceived interaction goals with 
three items each (Tazelaar et al., 2004). 
Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
received either course credit or monetary payment of 7 euro ($8).  
Results 
Cooperation 
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 We present relevant means and standard deviations in Table 1. 
 Round 1. To understand participants’ cooperative behavior (i.e., intended number of 
coins donated to the other player) independently of the influence of partner strategy and 
noise, decisions in the first round (which were made before participants had encountered 
noise or the partner strategy) were analyzed separately in a 2 (interaction type) × 2 (noise) × 2 
(gender) ANCOVA. Participants’ self-reported experience with decision-making tasks 
involving coins (0 = no, 1 = yes) was included as a covariate in this analysis, to control for 
possible learning effects due to previous experience with the social dilemma task in other 
studies in our laboratory.6 The analysis indicated only main effects for interaction type, F(1, 
285) = 3.82, p = .052, η
2 
= .012, for gender, F(1, 285) = 6.05, p = .009, η
2 
= .021, and for 
experience, F(1, 285) = 22.10, p < .001, η2 = .067. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
representatives displayed marginally lower initial cooperation than individuals (i.e., a 
discontinuity effect). Additionally, women (M = 4.94, SD = 3.01) displayed significantly 
lower initial cooperation than men (M = 5.83, SD = 3.23). Finally, participants with no prior 
experience of the social dilemma task (M = 4.48, SD = 2.84) displayed lower initial 
cooperation than participants with prior experience (M = 6.18, SD = 3.17). 
 Rounds 2-35. Participants’ cooperative behavior in the remaining 34 rounds of the 
social dilemma task was averaged into a single index of cooperation. This cooperation index 
was entered as dependent variable in a 2 (interaction type) × 2 (noise) × 2 (gender) 
ANCOVA, with prior experience as a covariate.
7
 In line with Hypothesis 2, the analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of noise, F(1, 285) = 4.92, p = .027, η2 = .015, indicating 
that cooperation was lower in the noise condition than in the no-noise condition. 
Furthermore, the analysis indicated a significant main effect of experience, F(1, 285) = 21.01, 
p < .001, η2 = .065, indicating that participants with no prior task experience (M = 5.15, SD = 
2.40) cooperated less than those with prior experience (M = 6.48, SD = 2.72). The main effect 
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of interaction type was not significant, F(1, 285) = 0.84, p = .360, η
2 
= .003, nor was the 
effect of gender, F(1, 285) = 1.94, p = .164, η2 = .006. As such, the initial differences in 
cooperation between representatives and individuals in Round 1 did not culminate in 
significant differences between their subsequent cooperation levels. Hence, the Round 2-35 
interval did not provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
Crucially, the analysis revealed a marginally significant Interaction Type × Noise 
interaction effect, F(1, 285) = 3.62, p = .058, η2 = .011. Planned follow-up tests of simple 
effects indicated that, in the representative condition, noise (vs. no noise) significantly 
reduced cooperation, F(1, 285) = 8.45, p = .004, η2 = .026. In the individual condition, 
however, noise had no significant effect on cooperation, F(1, 285) = 0.05, p = .827, η
2 
= .000. 
Looked at from a different angle, cooperation between representatives was significantly 
lower than between individuals (i.e., a discontinuity effect) in the noise condition, F(1, 285) = 
3.93, p = .048, η2 = .012. In the no-noise condition, however, cooperation between 
individuals did not differ significantly from cooperation between representatives, F(1, 285) = 
0.50, p = .481, η
2 
= .002. The absence of a significant discontinuity effect in this condition 
may seem surprising, but is consistent with prior research. When individuals and groups 
interact with a tit-for-tat strategy (as in the present experiment) in the absence of noise, the 
discontinuity effect is reduced and rendered non-significant (Insko et al., 1998; Wildschut et 
al., 2003). We return to this point in the Discussion. In sum, results indicate that instances of 
noise were particularly detrimental in intergroup (compared to interpersonal) contexts, and 
thereby amplified the discontinuity effect – a finding that supports Hypothesis 3.  
Noise trials. Representatives’ greater vulnerability to noise (relative to individuals) 
could reflect both a disinclination to incur the cost of repairing unintended negative effects of 
own-noise on others’ outcomes (i.e., greed) or a reluctance to respond trustingly to other-
noise (i.e., fear). To explore these possible explanations, we zoomed in on participants’ 
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decisions following instances of noise. In particular, we examined participants’ tendency to 
re-initiate cooperation following own-noise and to maintain cooperation following other-
noise. Relevant to greed, if representatives (compared to individuals) are disinclined to incur 
the cost of repairing unintended detrimental effects of own-noise on the other player’s 
outcomes then they should display lower cooperation levels following own-noise trials. For 
instance, when own cooperation declines in Round 4 due to noise, representatives should be 
less inclined than individuals to rebuild cooperation levels in Round 5. Relevant to fear, if 
representatives (compared to individuals) lack the benign partner impressions that are 
necessary to overcome other-noise then they should display lower cooperation levels 
following other-noise trials. For example, when the other player’s cooperation declines in 
Round 8, representatives should be less likely than individuals to respond trustingly, and thus 
should display lower cooperation in Round 9. 
 To explore these possibilities, we computed mean cooperation scores for participants’ 
decisions in the four rounds that followed own-noise (i.e., Rounds 5, 13, 21, and 29) and for 
their decisions in the four rounds that followed other-noise (i.e., Rounds 9, 17, 25, and 33). 
These scores were analyzed in 2 (interaction type) × 2 (noise) × 2 (gender) ANCOVAs. The 
predicted Interaction Type × Noise effect was significant for responses to other-noise, F(1, 
285) = 5.74, p = .017, η2 = .020, but not for responses to own-noise F(1, 285) = 2.40, p = 
.122, η2 = .008 (Table 2).  
 Next, we probed the significant Interaction Type × Noise effect for responses to other-
noise. Representatives displayed significantly lower cooperation than individuals following 
other-noise, F(1, 285) = 6.38, p = .012, η2 = .022. In the no-noise condition, the simple effect 
of interaction type was not significant in these rounds, F(1, 285) = 0.73, p = .393, η2 = .003. 
Viewed from a different angle, representatives displayed significantly lower cooperation 
following other-noise than in the same rounds in the no-noise condition, F(1, 285) = 15.82, p 
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< .001, η
2
 = .053. For individuals, the simple effect of noise was not significant in these 
rounds, F(1, 285) = 0.36, p = .551, η2 = .001. Whereas we observed similar patterns for 
responses to own-noise, the Interaction Type × Noise interaction effect was not significant 
here, suggesting no reliable differences between representatives and individuals in their 
responses to own-noise.
8,9
      
Impressions of Benign Intent 
 We analyzed participants’ impressions of their partner’s global benign intent and of 
his/her specific interaction goals in 2 (interaction type) × 2 (noise) × 2 (gender) ANCOVAs 
(with prior experience as covariate). We present relevant means in Table 1. For global 
impressions of benign intent, the results revealed a significant main effect of interaction type 
only, F(1, 285) = 3.93, p = .048, η2 = .013. As predicted, individuals reported more benign 
partner impressions than did representatives. For the specific interaction goals, we obtained 
significant main effects of interaction type on MinDiff, F(1, 285) = 4.39, p = .037, η2 = .015, 
MaxOther, F(1, 285) = 5.83, p = .016, η2 = .020, MaxRel, F(1, 285) = 4.77, p = .030, η2 = 
.016, and MaxOwn, F(1, 285) = 13.46, p < .001, η
2 
= .043, but not on MaxJoint, F(1, 285) = 
1.87, p = .173, η2 = .006. Individuals (compared to representatives) attributed to the other 
player greater concern for minimizing differences and maximizing their (i.e., the 
participant’s) outcomes, and lesser concern for maximizing relative advantage and own (i.e., 
the other player’s) outcomes.10  
Conditional Process Analyses 
 Compared with individuals, representatives displayed less favorable impressions of 
their partner’s benign intent, and attributed to him/her less other-regarding (i.e., MinDiff and 
MaxOther), and more self-regarding (i.e., MaxOwn and MaxRel) interaction goals. We 
examined whether these potential mediating mechanisms explained why the discontinuity 
effect was more pronounced when noise was present (compared to absent). Specifically, we 
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tested a “direct effect and second stage moderation model” (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). This 
model specifies that the moderator (noise) affects the magnitude of the mediators’ (benign 
impressions, perceived interaction goals) partial association with the outcome (cooperation), 
and that this occurs in conjunction with a main effect of the independent variable (interaction 
type) on the mediators (Figure 1). This model is appropriate because interaction type 
influenced the potential mediators irrespective of noise, but influenced cooperation only in 
the noise condition. We therefore tested the mediated effects of interaction type on 
cooperation, conditional upon noise. 
First, we assessed whether the moderator (noise) affected the magnitude of the 
mediators’ (global benign impressions, perceived interaction goals) associations with the 
outcome (cooperation) by testing, for each mediator, the Noise × Mediator interaction. This 
tested whether global benign impressions and perceived interaction goals were stronger 
predictors of cooperation when noise was present (compared to absent). We found significant 
interaction effects between noise and, respectively, MinDiff and MaxRel. Results further 
revealed marginal interactions between noise and, respectively, Benign Impressions and 
MaxOwn (Table 3, A × C). Global benign impressions and partners’ greater (compared to 
lesser) perceived concern for minimizing differences in outcomes predicted increased 
cooperation in the noise condition (Benign Impressions: F[1,277] = 17.39, p < .001, η2 = 
.051; MinDiff: F[1,277] = 35.03, p < .001, η2 = .094), but these associations were not 
significant in the no-noise condition (Benign Impressions: F[1,277] = 2.24, p = .136, η
2 
= 
.006; MinDiff: F[1,277] = 1.61, p = .205, η2 = .004). Partners’ greater (compared to lesser) 
perceived concern for maximizing own outcomes and relative advantage in outcomes, 
conversely, predicted decreased cooperation in the noise condition (MaxOwn: F[1,277] = 
7.13, p = .008, η2 = .021; MaxRel: Noise: F[1,277] = 8.67, p = .004, η2 = .026), but did not in 
the no-noise condition (MaxOwn: F[1,277] = 0.00, p = .977, η
2 
= .000; MaxRel: No noise: 
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F[1,277] = 0.05, p = .822, η2 = .000). Furthermore, the previously significant Noise × 
Interaction Type interaction on cooperation (Table 3, A × B) became non-significant or 
marginal when we controlled for the interaction between noise and, respectively, Benign 
Impressions, MaxRel, MinDiff, and MaxOwn.   
Next, we used the PROCESS macro to test the conditional process model shown in 
Figure 1 (model 15; 10,000 resamples; Hayes, 2013). The mediator was, in turn, Benign 
Impressions, MinDiff, MaxOwn, or MaxRel. PROCESS calculates bootstrap confidence 
intervals (CIs) for the indirect effect (denoted as ab) of interaction type on cooperation via 
each of the mediators, conditional upon noise. In the noise condition, this indirect effect was 
significant (i.e., the 95% CI did not include 0) for Benign Impressions (ab = -.09, SE = .05, 
95% CI = -.21/-.01), MinDiff (ab = -.16, SE = .08, 95% CI = -.33/-.02), MaxOwn (ab = -.10, 
SE = .06, 95% CI = -.24/-.02), and MaxRel (ab = -.09, SE = .05, 95% CI = -.21/-.01). In the 
no-noise condition, this indirect effect was not significant for Benign Impressions (ab = -.03, 
SE = .03, 95% CI = -.13/.01), MinDiff  (ab = -.04, SE = .03, 95% CI = -.14/.01), MaxOwn 
(ab = -.00, SE = .05, 95% CI = -.11/.11), or MaxRel (ab = .01, SE = .03, 95% CI = -.03/.08). 
When the four mediators were entered simultaneously as parallel mediators, the indirect 
effect in the noise condition remained significant only for MinDiff (ab = -.17, SE = .09, 95% 
CI = -.36/-.03), and was not significant for Benign Impressions (ab = -.02, SE = .02, 95% CI 
= -.11/.04), MaxOwn (ab = -.00, SE = .05, 95% CI = -.10/.09), or MaxRel (ab = .04, SE = 
.04, 95% CI = -.01/.15). In the no-noise condition, the indirect effect was not significant for 
Benign Impressions (ab = -.02, SE = .04, 95% CI = -.12/.03), MinDiff (ab = -.06, SE = .05, 
95% CI = -.20/.01), MaxOwn (ab = .00, SE = .07, 95% CI = -.13/.15), or MaxRel (ab = .05, 
SE = .05, 95% CI = -.01/.19). 
The mediational analyses yielded practically identical results when zooming in on 
responses to other-noise (Rounds 9, 17, 25, and 33). Here too, the interaction-type effect in 
Page 17 of 32
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gpir
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
COPING WITH NOISE 
 
18
the noise condition was mediated by Benign Impressions (ab = -.11, SE = .06, 95% CI = -
.26/-.01), MinDiff (ab = -.18, SE = .09, 95% CI = -.38/-.02), MaxOwn (ab = -.15, SE = .07, 
95% CI = -.32/-.05), and MaxRel (ab = -.12, SE = .06, 95% CI = -.26/-.02). Only the indirect 
effect through MinDiff remained significant (ab = -.17, SE = .09, 95% CI = -.37/-.02) when 
testing all mediators in parallel. 
In sum, the discontinuity effect in the noise condition was mediated by benign 
impressions of the partner, and by perceptions of the partner’s concern for maximizing own 
outcomes, relative advantage in outcomes, and (particularly) minimizing differences in 
outcomes. These results are consistent with the idea that (a) benign partner impressions help 
to cope with the detrimental effects of noise on cooperation and (b) group representatives 
(compared to individuals) are less likely to form such benign partner impressions, and 
thereby are less able to overcome the deleterious effects of noise. Accordingly, the 
discontinuity effect is accentuated when noise is present (compared to absent). 
Discussion 
We examined the impact of unintended errors, or noise, in interindividual and 
intergroup contexts. To this end, we compared social dilemma interactions between group 
representatives with interactions between isolated individuals in the presence or absence of 
noise. Noise exerted detrimental effects on cooperation between group representatives but 
had no significant impact on cooperation between individuals. Viewed from a different angle, 
representatives were less cooperative than individuals in the presence of noise, but did not 
differ significantly from individuals when noise was absent (in line with previous evidence 
involving tit-for-tat strategies, see Insko et al., 1998; Wildschut et al., 2003). Accordingly, the 
presence (vs. absence) of noise accentuated the discontinuity effect. These findings provide 
important insight into how interindividual-intergroup discontinuity may unfold in realistic, 
noisy environments, and show that these environments are less conductive to intergroup 
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cooperation than the non-noisy environments in which this contrast has previously been 
studied. This offers important insights into the origins and potential resolution of intergroup 
conflict. We discuss these contributions next. 
The Impact of Noise in Intergroup Contexts 
The literature on the discontinuity effect indicates two major mechanisms whereby the 
impact of noise might be magnified in intergroup settings: greed and fear. People’s greater 
greed in intergroup contexts could make them reluctant to incur the cost of repairing 
unintended detrimental effects of own-noise on others’ outcomes. However, the discontinuity 
effect was not significantly larger in rounds following own-noise than in the same rounds 
with no noise. Thus, results did not support the own-noise explanation. People’s greater fear 
in intergroup contexts could reduce their willingness to give others the benefit of the doubt, 
and to respond cooperatively to other-noise. Indeed, the discontinuity effect was significantly 
larger in rounds following other-noise than in the same rounds with no noise. This finding 
suggests that the stronger impact of noise in interactions between representatives may be 
rooted in people’s greater fear of interdependent others in intergroup contexts. This 
conclusion is further supported by the notion that the discontinuity effect in the noise 
condition was mediated by partner impressions, and particularly by perceptions of the 
partner’s concern for minimizing differences in outcomes. Whereas individuals’ positive 
partner impressions limited the deleterious effect of noise, representatives’ negative partner 
impressions obstructed the trusting interpretations and generous behaviors that are necessary 
to overcome noise (Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009; Kollock, 1993). To 
further identify how fear and greed contribute to the impact of noise in intergroup contexts, a 
valuable avenue for future research would be to test directly these processes and the 
mechanisms through which they may operate (e.g., examining people’s tendency to interpret 
partner noise as intentional, and to remedy the deleterious consequences of own-noise for 
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others), as well as alternative processes that may contribute to this relationship (e.g., 
tendencies to employ noise deceptively for personal gain, willingness to sustain the costs 
associated with responding generously). 
It is noteworthy that when noise was absent, representatives achieved the same high 
levels of cooperation as individuals, even though their initial cooperation levels had been 
lower (see Round 1 results). This finding is encouraging, as it suggests that group 
representatives are capable of developing cooperative relations between groups if instances of 
noise can be avoided. However, the absence of a discontinuity effect within this environment 
does contrast with prior research. How can this discrepancy be understood, and what does 
this imply for the present conclusions? As noted, our method differed in several respects from 
prior discontinuity research, which may have impacted participants’ level of cooperation. We 
outline two major differences, and their implications for the present conclusions, below.  
The first major difference is that we examined interactions between group 
representatives, whereas prior research on the discontinuity effect has mostly examined 
interactions between groups of participants who followed a consensus decision rule. 
Representatives interact one-on-one (similar to individuals) and thus lack the anonymity and 
mutual support that group members enjoy (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). Accordingly, 
interactions between representatives may be less competitive than interactions between entire 
groups and this could have contributed to the absence of a discontinuity effect in the no-noise 
condition. The second major difference is that we used a reciprocal strategy to simulate the 
other player, whereas prior research has mostly examined interactions between two 
individuals or groups whose strategies were unconstrained. The discontinuity effect is 
attenuated by reciprocal strategies (Insko et al., 1998; Wildschut et al., 2003) and, hence, this 
second methodological difference could also have contributed to the absence of a 
discontinuity effect in the no-noise condition. To address these issues, future research would 
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do well to examine the impact of noise on the discontinuity effect in a context where groups 
follow a consensus rule and players’ strategies are unconstrained. Whereas the overall rate of 
intergroup competition should be higher in that context, our key finding that noise 
accentuates the discontinuity effect should replicate because (1) groups (relative to 
individuals) lack benign partner impressions (Hoyle et al., 1989; Insko & Schopler, 1998; 
Pemberton et al., 1996) and (2) benign partner impressions are particularly important in the 
context of noise (relative to no-noise), as the present findings showed. 
Broader Implications 
The concept of noise has been largely absent from the literature on intergroup 
relations. This is surprising because, in everyday life, intergroup interactions are often 
characterized by differences in norms, culture, and ideology, which may increase the 
likelihood of misunderstanding (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; 
Morris & Peng, 1994). The present research provides evidence that noise is particularly 
harmful in intergroup settings and accentuates the discontinuity effect. Indeed, past research 
may have underestimated the competitiveness of intergroup relations: in environments 
without noise, the competitive impressions and interaction goals that characterize intergroup 
interactions may be less detrimental to cooperation. The present research thus underlines the 
importance of considering noise in future theorizing and research on intergroup relations. In 
doing so, such initiatives should consider not only negative noise, as in the present 
contribution, but also positive noise, or combinations of the two (i.e., neutral noise; 
Signorino, 1996). 
In addition, our findings also shed light on how to reduce the discontinuity effect by 
increasing intergroup cooperation. Prior perspectives have proposed a range of initiatives to 
increase intergroup cooperation, including reciprocal strategies and the pursuit of long-term 
goals (Cohen & Insko, 2008). As the present findings suggest, such strategies may be 
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compromised by instances of noise. We propose that generosity, or returning greater 
cooperativeness than that received from another individual or group, is necessary to counter 
the negative impact of noise (Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009). The question of how to promote 
such generosity in context of competitive groups is an important challenge for future 
research. One promising idea is based on prior evidence that representatives who received 
sufficient autonomy to conduct the group’s interactions at their own discretion, without fears 
of being penalized by their constituents, employed more cooperative strategies to maximize 
long-term gain and collective interests (Pinter et al., 2007; also see Milinski et al., 2016). This 
orientation would seem more conducive to the generous strategies that are necessary to 
overcome noise. For these reasons, we suggest that autonomous (i.e., unaccountable) 
representatives may hold the key to overcoming the impact of noise, and enhancing 
cooperation in intergroup contexts. 
Coda 
Although intergroup interactions may be particularly prone to noise in everyday life, 
little is known about the impact of unintended errors on decision making in intergroup 
contexts. The present research addressed this by comparing interindividual and intergroup 
interactions in social dilemma environments with or without noise. Results indicated that 
noise was more detrimental to intergroup than interindividual cooperation and, hence, 
accentuated the discontinuity effect. In light of the far-reaching implications of intergroup 
interactions (in politics, collective bargaining, and international relations), the present 
research underscores the importance of considering noise in theorizing about intergroup 
conflict and in initiatives to resolve it.  
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Footnotes 
1 The original sample included two non-adult individuals (aged 14 and 10). In light of 
the study’s framing (i.e., in terms of rivaling universities), we excluded them from data 
analysis. 
2 In fact, participants’ chances of winning in a post-experimental raffle were not 
contingent on task outcomes.  
3 This paradigm is more suitable for examining coping with noise than the 
dichotomous decisions that have been used in some previous research (e.g., Axelrod & Dion, 
1988; Kollock, 1993), as people can communicate intentions and goals more profoundly 
through in- and decreases of their gradual level of cooperation. 
 
4
 We informed participants about the possibility of noise because they are unlikely to 
expect unintended errors in an experiment and, hence, would assume all of their partner’s 
decisions to be intentional. 
 5 If participants intended to give no coins then an incidence of noise could reduce this 
no further and, hence, would go by unnoticed. However, previous research has indicated that 
typically a high percentage of noise comes through (over 90%, see Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van 
Lange et al., 2002). Here, of the eight instances of noise, on average 86.8% came through. 
This rate did not differ between interpersonal and intergroup interactions (p = .62). 
6 Experience in social dilemma tasks is strongly predictive of cooperation, as it 
promotes understanding that cooperative strategies afford higher outcomes in repeated 
interaction (Allison & Messick, 1985). Around the time when we conducted the present 
study, other studies in the same laboratory also used the coin paradigm (Van Lange, 
Klapwijk, & Van Munster, 2011; Vuolevi & Van Lange, 2012). As a precaution, we made the 
a priori decision to assess participants’ prior experience with the paradigm. Of the 294 
participants, 134 indicated having played the coin paradigm before, and these participants 
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displayed significantly higher levels of cooperation than those without prior experience (see 
main text). To control for this, we included experience in all analyses. Doing so increased the 
statistical power to detect effects of our manipulations (by reducing the within-group error 
variance), both for the main effect of Interaction Type in Round 1 (with covariate: F[1, 285] 
= 3.82, p = .052, η2 = .012; without covariate: F[1, 286] = 3.19, p = .075, η2 = .011) and for 
the interaction effect between Interaction Type × Noise in Rounds 2-35 (with covariate: F[1, 
285] = 3.62, p = .058, η2 = .011; without covariate: F[1, 286] = 2.19, p = .140, η2 = .008).  
7 A repeated measures ANCOVA on cooperation in Rounds 2-35 indicated only a 
single significant interaction effect involving rounds and noise, F(18.31, 5219.88) = 3.83, p < 
.001, η
2 
= .013 (indicating a modest increase in cooperation in interactions without noise, and 
a gradual decline and slight recovery in noisy interactions). Accordingly, we only present the 
(more parsimonious) analysis on average cooperation here. 
8 Additionally, these analyses indicated significant main effects of noise for both 
responses to other-noise, F(1, 285) = 10.53, p = .001, η2 = .036, and responses to own-noise, 
F(1, 285) = 7.73, p = .006, η
2 
= .026. 
9 The interaction (as well as simple effects tests) remained significant when we 
controlled for participants’ level of cooperation in the preceding round (i.e., prior to the 
occurrence of noise). 
10 Additionally, the analyses revealed isolated effects involving gender, indicating that 
men attributed greater concern for maximizing own outcomes to their partner than women, 
F(1, 285) = 5.72, p = .017, η2 = .018; that women, but not men attributed greater concern for 
relative advantage to their partner in intergroup contexts than in interpersonal contexts, F(1, 
285) = 2.88, p = .091, η2 = .009; and that women displayed more benign impressions than 
men in interactions without noise, but not in noisy interactions, F(1, 285) = 3.61, p = .058, η2 
= .012.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for Mean Cooperation, Benign 
Impressions, and Impressions of Specific Interaction Goals as a Function of Noise (No Noise 
vs. Noise) and Interaction Type (Individuals vs. Representatives). 
 No noise Noise 
 Individuals 
(n = 72) 
Representatives 
(n = 72) 
Individuals 
(n = 74) 
Representatives 
(n = 76) 
Cooperation (0-10)     
  Round 1 5.83 (3.13) 4.68 (2.92) 5.57 (3.25) 4.93 (3.03) 
  Rounds 2-35 (mean) 6.13 (2.60) 6.15 (2.49) 5.81 (2.55) 4.96 (2.73) 
Partner impressions (1-7)     
  Benign Impressions 4.26 (0.75) 4.06 (0.85) 4.25 (0.88) 4.03 (0.95) 
  MinDiff 4.40 (1.27) 4.11 (1.28) 4.28 (1.22) 3.89 (1.42) 
  MaxJoint 4.50 (1.35) 4.22 (1.38) 4.27 (1.53) 3.96 (1.54) 
  MaxOther 3.18 (1.08) 2.89 (0.99) 3.11 (0.99) 2.76 (1.03) 
  MaxOwn 3.81 (1.25) 4.52 (1.17) 4.07 (1.34) 4.47 (1.21) 
  MaxRel 4.23 (1.27) 4.63 (1.31) 4.12 (1.40) 4.57 (1.20) 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for Mean Cooperation in Rounds 
Following Noise as a Function of Noise (No Noise vs. Noise) and Interaction Type 
(Individuals vs. Representatives). 
 Individuals Representatives 
 No noise  Noise No noise  Noise 
Following other-noise 6.07 (3.03) 5.39 (2.77) 6.15 (2.97) 4.29 (2.88) 
Following own-noise  6.33 (2.73) 5.82 (2.86) 6.33 (2.60) 4.98 (2.94) 
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Table 3. Conditional Process Analyses: Testing the Effect of Noise on the Magnitude of the Mediators’ Association with Cooperation (Effect A × 
C). 
 Mediator 
 Benign 
Impressions 
 
MinDiff 
 
MaxOther 
 
MaxOwn 
 
MaxRel 
 F p F p F p F p F p 
Noise (A) 5.63 .018 3.49 .063 3.96 .047 2.59 .109 4.93 .027 
Interaction type (B) 0.46 .498 0.54 .816 0.05 .830 0.25 .618 0.50 .480 
A × B 1.68 .196 2.78 .097 3.74 .054 3.22 .074 2.42 .121 
Mediator (C) 15.15 < .001 26.26 < .001 23.66 < .001 3.24 .073 3.66 .057 
A × C 2.77 .097 11.23 .001 0.00 .987 3.09 .080 5.04 .026 
Note. The dependent variable in each analysis is mean cooperation. Denominator degrees of freedom equal 277. 
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Figure 1.  The conditional process model tested in this experiment. 
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